Progress to European Union - A Challenge for the Public Service. EIPAScope 1992(3):pp. 1-8 by Sutherland, Peter.
Progress to European Union - A Challenge for the Public Service
Speech delivered by Peter Sutherland, Chairman of the Board of EIPA and President of the 
Allied Irish Bank, at the Conference on 'Effective & Efficient Public Management in the New 
Europe', Dublin, 23-30 April 1992*
Introduction
Why should we be thinking about the European Public Service and European Public 
Management now? Don't we have a European Public Service? Isn't this what all those 
'Brussels Bureaucrats' in the Commission and the other Community institutions are supposed 
to be doing?
In a sense this is correct. We should not forget that, along with having its own sources of 
revenue and financial resources and its own legal system, having its own public service is one 
of the things that distinguishes the EC from other international organizations and gives it a 
supranational character.  
But this is only the beginning of the story and not the end. We have now reached an important 
stage in the process of creating a European Public Service which will contribute considerably 
to the process of integration if it is well managed.
Community development in the 1990s requires much more attention to the management 
capacities and skills needed to make EC policies work effectively. Since nothing in the 
European Community is ever simple, we need to see the development of the European Public 
Service in two perspectives. First, there is the core Community institutions, in particular the 
European Commission which is responsible for overseeing the management of Community 
policies. Within the Commission it is possible to envisage the introduction of many 
straightforward management reforms to improve operational performance and, equally badly 
needed, coordination. Second, in a broader perspective, there is the design and development of 
new management systems and administrative networks reaching out to all levels of 
government in the Member States. In this perspective the European Public Service is built up 
on partnerships between the Community institutions and the administrations of the Member 
States. And, in this broader perspective, we probably have to rethink the role of the 
Community.
New Ideas, Old Problems
There are two reasons why we need to be thinking carefully about European Public 
Management in a broader perspective.
1. We need to think about giving operational meaning to the principle of subsidiarity. We all 
know that, in concept, subsidiarity means that decisions should be made and responsibilities 
located at the lowest level of administration consistent with effective performance and, of 
course, policy coordination. Whether we are moving towards European federalism or not, 
subsidiarity implies a need to develop partnerships and working relationships among different 
levels of administration with a clear idea of who is responsible for doing what. (Continued on 
following page)
Administrative partnerships are not new in themselves. This is the way EC administration has 
evolved. Indeed it would be an odd kind of Community in which members did not actively 
participate in the work of Community development. But there are good reasons for considering 
in more explicit terms exactly how such partnerships should work and what is involved in 
making them work effectively.
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12. We need to think about European Public Management now because we have not thought 
enough about it previously. Other things seemed more important but unless we pay attention to 
it now, we may find that we cannot achieve the objectives that are important and that we are 
now committed to.
Competences and Capacities
What this means is that at the beginning of the 1990s we live in a remarkably different world. 
The changes that have already taken place are epoch-making. The political forces operating 
are quite different. The economic circumstances have changed, partly but not only as a result 
of earlier initiatives. The only thing we can be certain about is that there is a great deal more to 
come, even though we cannot forecast with any certainty what it will be.
It is against this background that we need to give urgent attention to the future shape and 
required capacities of the European Public Service. The past few years have seen sharp rises in 
hopes, expectations and ambitions. The competences of the EC have been enlarged. The 
responsibilities of the Commission for making European policies work in practice have been 
increased. The main question we have to ask is whether there are the capacities to match the 
increased competence?
On paper, the EC has acquired a substantial increase in its legal competences, but in practice 
does it have the management capacities to exercise them effectively?
The challenge for the public service is to ensure that there is a good match between 
competences and capacities. But, given the pace of recent change there is an a priori case for 
suggesting that the EC has a management deficit.
The management deficit has received much less attention than the democratic deficit. There is 
a well-established litany of complaints about the democratic deficit of the EC. Current moves 
to upgrade the role of the European Parliament reflect this. But there has been little systematic 
analysis or public discussion of the management deficit. It seems to have been assumed that 
management capacities would somehow increase automatically as new responsibilities and 
competences were acquired. Anyone who knows anything about organizations or management 
knows that there is nothing automatic about this process. Anyone who knows anything about 
government or public administration knows that there are strong pressures to act as if the 
opposite were true in order to get decisions through, on the assumption that implementation 
will 'somehow' be taken care of.
The challenge for the public services is really twofold. First, there is the problem of 
identifying and diagnosing the management deficit. Second, there is the problem of 
prescribing ways to bridge the gap between existing capacities and those that will be needed in 
the future.
The Management Deficit: Diagnosis
Considering diagnosis first, it must be acknowledged that there is no substitute for detailed 
case-by-case examination of the requirements for effective policy management in specific 
policy fields. The needs and capacities in regional policy are not the same as those in social 
policy or in relation to monetary union. Nevertheless there are some things that can be said in 
general terms to establish the main dimensions of discussion.
In summary, the main diagnostic question is, are there enough of the right kinds of people in 
the right places to do the work? To start with, we can focus on the Commission itself, though it 
will soon become apparent that this is an exceedingly artificial restriction.
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publicized view, more readily accepted in some countries than in others, that Europe is about 
to be taken over by an enormous army of Brussels-based bureaucrats, this may seem a 
surprising question to ask. But closer knowledge of the Commission reveals that the attention 
it receives is related to its importance in the policy process and not the size of the human 
resources it has to devote to policy management. In fact, by governmental standards the 
Commission is a rather small organization and its resources are increasingly thinly spread over 
a widening range of policy responsibilities. Ignoring the 4,000 or more personnel in translation 
and research activities, the total staff of the Commission is about 11,000. These staff are 
distributed across 23 Directorates-General and support services. It is evident from these 
figures that most DGs only have staffs numbered in hundreds and not in thousands. The 
professional component of their staff is only a small proportion of this total.
In any case, the Commission is not master of its own house. The Council of Ministers must 
approve increases in permanent staff complements. Far from there being an automatic process 
of increasing capacities to match increased competences, the Member States are reluctant, for 
domestic political reasons, to be seen to be approving increased Eurocracy. To some extent 
disparities can be compensated by off-budget expenditure on temporary staff. But it is hard to 
escape the conclusion that in quantitative terms there is likely to be a management deficit in 
the Commission. Whether they recognize it or not, by limiting the permanent staff of the 
Commission, they are implicitly accepting more responsibility for European policy 
management themselves.
2. This conclusion is reinforced once we switch from quantitative to qualitative factors: do we 
have the right kinds of people with the right management skills? Looking at the recent 
evolution of the EC it seems that we may be at a watershed. The last few years have been an 
important period of political invention, new policies and new institutions and procedures have 
been devised in several policy fields, including industry, technology, education, social policy, 
environment and monetary policy. Invention will not suddenly cease. But in the next few years 
there will need to be an increasing emphasis on innovation, making new policies work 
effectively in practice. Unless this is taken seriously, the EC will simply build up an increasing 
overload of new policies which are workable in principle but impossible to implement in 
practice because the management capacities are not there.  
The distinction between invention and innovation is very broad but nevertheless important for 
two reasons. First, the Commission is much more oriented to inventing new policies and 
enshrining them in Community law than to ensuring their effective implementation at the 
national and subnational levels. This will not be easy to change. The main instrument of policy 
implementation in the Community is the directive, which is recast in national law and 
administered by national and subnational authorities. This kind of hierarchical regulatory 
process is much more suited to administering simple stable policies than policies that are 
complex, interdependent and liable to change in the course of implementation. Once 
implementation is viewed as an innovative process rather than a routine process, new kinds of 
partnerships between the Commission and implementing authorities are needed. These new 
partnerships place new demands on national organizations as well as on the Commission.
A narrow focus on invention avoids addressing the many practical problems that arise in the 
process of putting policies into effect. Even the best formulated policy cannot possibly take 
account of all eventualities. Questions of detailed interpretation and questions of adaptation to 
unforeseen circumstances are almost certain to arise. The implications of new policies need to 
be seen as a whole and the conditions required to make them feasible and effective throughout 
the Community should be carefully considered.
The innovative skills and capacities needed to secure effective implementation are different 
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many respects they are the capacities required for planning and management of change. This 
includes a frank recognition that some resistance to change is to be expected and that plans for 
implementation should be robust enough to circumvent or overcome them. Another basic 
requirement is a feasibility study to assess the availability and suitability of resources required 
for policy implementation. This leads to the second main point. The distinction between policy 
invention and policy innovation is probably a more appropriate and useful way of viewing the 
development of European policies than the old and largely discredited policy/administration 
dichotomy. The challenges confronting the European Public Service in the 1990s are not 
routine processes of putting in place predefined policies. A great deal of policy development is 
likely to take place in the course of successive attempts to implement policies. The 
policy/administration dichotomy tends to portray implementation as a routine preprogrammed 
process. Making the distinction between invention and innovation shifts the emphasis to 
adaptation. However, it requires that the organizations deliberately seek to build on and learn 
from successive implementation initiatives. Again, the management skills and capacities 
required to enable public officials to manage innovation are quite different from those that are 
appropriate for managing more routine and programmed tasks.
It is important that the differences are recognized and that action is taken to shift the emphasis 
from programmed implementation to the management of innovation. Otherwise, time and 
effort are likely to be wasted in introspective efforts to refine policy concepts and produce 
over-elaborate and detailed directives and standard operating procedures that make effective 
implementation less, rather than more likely.
3. The Commission is not flexible enough in its personnel and human resource management 
policies to move people into the right places as the pressure of work and policy priorities 
change. For various historical reasons mobility is restricted and staffing profiles are difficult to 
change within as well as between DGs.
Even if there were none of the quantitative and qualitative constraints that have already been 
mentioned, lack of flexibility and mobility would contribute to creating a management deficit. 
It is not difficult to think of ways in which mobility could be deliberately encouraged. But the 
established practices and the reward systems of the Commission militate against it.  
It would be easy to make the Commission the scapegoat for the shortcomings of the EC. In 
fact it is almost a surprise to find that this role was not formally written into the Treaty of 
Rome. It is highly probable that journalists will focus increasingly on any delays or difficulties 
in implementing the 1992 programme and lay the blame at the Commission's door.
However, what goes on in the Commission is only a small part of the total EC policy 
management process. It is a strategically important point but, nevertheless, it is only a fraction 
of the total volume of activity. What goes on outside the Commission is quantitatively more 
important. It is here, when we begin to consider the external dimension of EC policy 
management that some of the most distinctive and difficult challenges involved in developing 
a European Public Service arise. To anticipate - and deflect - some familiar responses, this is 
an area where familiar business management models provide little guidance. Innovation rather 
than imitation is what is needed.
While there is no doubt that a rethink of the Commission's approach to its management tasks is 
needed - and some moves have already been made in this direction - even if the internal 
functioning of the Commission were substantially improved, the impact on EC policy 
performance would be small. More of the right people in the right places in the Commission 
should help. But in an important sense, the European Public Service is Community-wide. It is 
distributed across all the Member States. This means that a great deal of the variance of 
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various levels of administration in the Member States.  
An Administrative Community
The same quantitative, qualitative and flexibility questions that were asked about the 
Commission also have to be asked of the large numbers of organizations in the Member States 
that are wholly or partly involved in delivering EC policies. It would be politically impossible 
and administratively unwise to try to link all of these organizations into a unified hierarchical 
structure. The challenge for the public service in Europe is to create an administrative 
community based on strengthening partnerships at and among the various levels of 
government. This is where one of the biggest and most important differences between business 
management and public management makes itself felt. The basic unit of business management 
is the single organization. The basic unit of public management is a network of organizations. 
Businesses collaborate through coalitions, consortia, strategic alliances, joint ventures and 
subcontractor and franchising relations. But if these relations cease to pay off for the 
individual organizations they can decide to change or withdraw. In government, relationships 
are often mandatory and may be prescribed by law. The problem then is to make them work; 
to establish an effective basis for partnership and collaboration. Public management is usually 
getting things done through other organizations.
The EC's management deficit is due to a large extent to weaknesses and deficiencies in the 
capacities and linkages in the networks through which EC policies are administered. In a way, 
this is not surprising because in many, if not most, cases the organizations involved were not 
created to administer EC policies. They were formed with different purposes in view and there 
is therefore a 'management of change' problem in adapting them to serve EC objectives. In 
addition, there is no reason to suppose that the relationships among the organizations will 
develop naturally to establish a basis for effective cooperation. Just as an effort is needed to 
redesign organizations to fit them to different purposes so is an effort also needed to develop 
the linkages and establish coordination procedures that are essential to the smooth and 
effective operation of a network of organizations. To have a basic insight into the size of the 
task and the possible scale of the management deficit, one only has to recall that coordination 
requires good, reliable communication which, in the EC, means communication through many 
different organizations embedded in twelve different administrative systems and encoded in 
nine official languages.
Consolidating, strengthening, even creating and developing the right kinds of administrative 
networks is becoming one of the most important challenges ahead. It is clearly in the area of 
innovation rather than invention. It is also management among organizations rather than 
simply management within organizations. To underline the change that is involved in 
management of the Community's policies it might help to take up two broad themes. One is 
the implementation of the principle of subsidiarity and the other is the increasing importance 
of positive integration relative to negative integration.
Subsidiarity
The principle of subsidiarity could be an important element in the design of European public 
management networks. But it is important not to overstate or misrepresent the contribution that 
it can make. It is no panacea. At present there seems to be a danger that whenever an issue or 
problem in the administration of EC policies arises someone will suggest that the principle of 
subsidiarity is the answer. Even if the principle of subsidiarity could be applied as a formula to 
determine the optimum allocation of administrative functions, it would not answer all the 
questions that arise in the development of a European Public Service. In particular, it provides 
no real solution to problems of coordination and integration.
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answer. Subsidiarity applied to environmental policy or the structural funds is likely to 
produce different answers to the problem of assigning responsibilities among different levels 
of government. More awkwardly, deciding what is the lowest appropriate level at which the 
same policy should be handled in different countries such as Ireland, Denmark, Spain and 
Greece could produce different answers if the subsidiarity principle were taken seriously and a 
systematic audit of management capacities conducted. If no real attempt to assemble some 
such information is made, the results of delegating the same responsibilities to authorities with 
widely different management capacities will result in uneven standards of performance or even 
serious policy failures.
On the other hand, a great deal could be learned about how to make the pluralistic public 
service we are now developing in the EC more effective by making systematic efforts to 
operationalize the principle of subsidiarity in specific policy fields. If the Commission were to 
function as the focus of this management of innovation process, it would need to upgrade its 
capacities for assessing the capacities of its partner organizations and also play an active part 
in designing the systems and developing the networks required to implement EC policies.  
One of the important links between subsidiarity and the management of integration is in 
determining where and how coordination takes place. Who decides where coordination is 
needed and how it should be managed? The management of the structural funds is a case in 
point. With speakers in the conference who can talk more expertly and fully about the present 
system of coordination for the structural funds it is probably not necessary to say much more 
on the subject now. But clearly the decisions made about the location of coordination 
responsibilities have an important effect on where work loads arise and where management 
capacities need to be developed and strengthened.
Subsidiarity does not mean more decentralization regardless of other considerations. Like all 
so-called principles of management there is a counterbalancing principle. In this case the 
Commission's watchdog function of safeguarding compliance with the Treaties and 
maintaining overall control of the system imposes a limit on the extent of delegation. It also 
creates some significant requirements for management information systems spanning 
organizational boundaries as well as for audit and evaluation capacities aimed at promoting 
better performance rather than just imposing sanctions on substandard performance.
Negative Integration and Positive Integration
The 'marketing' of the single market has put great emphasis on negative integration and the 
removal of national obstacles to trade. Since Maastricht more has been heard of the 
development of EC policies which suggest a shift of emphasis to positive integration. Since 
negative integration is associated with deregulation and greater reliance on markets, it is 
tempting to see positive integration as involving more reliance on government and therefore 
having direct implications for public management.
This is roughly right. But it gives too crude a picture to be really useful. First of all, market 
integration is not just the removal of obstacles and distortions, it has positive as well as 
negative requirements. It is reregulation, not simply deregulation. A great deal of detailed and 
difficult work has to be done to create the framework within which markets operate. As the 
countries of Eastern Europe and the former Soviet Union are painfully discovering, efficient 
markets do not spring spontaneously into existence in the absence of government. Moreover, 
framing laws is only the first stage of the process of implementing a new structure. A great 
deal of continuing work is needed to maintain an appropriate market framework which takes 
account of consumer, environmental, employee and investor interests as well as of the 
businesses directly involved.
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reported in 'Volume VI' of the 'Rules Governing Medicinal Products in the European 
Community'. This is concerned with 'Establishment by the European Community of maximum 
residue limits (MRLs) for residues of veterinary medicinal products in foodstuffs of animal 
origin'. It is covered by Regulation EEC 2377/90. There is no need to go into the details of 
this, although it is very important from the standpoint of public health and consumer 
protection that the administrations concerned do go into all the details. The main point that 
needs to be made is that a new administrative system must be created at the Community level 
to replace the existing pattern of separate national authorities each operating its own 
procedures and applying its own criteria. The design of new systems in this and similar fields 
will involve an assessment of different organization design options and the careful 
development of institutional arrangements appropriate to the tasks involved. In all cases, this 
will require the Commission to manage the transition to the new Community-wide system.
Volume VI of 'The Rules Governing Medicinal Products in the European Community' will 
never get into the bestsellers list but it is very important that this kind of work is going on and 
that a network of public service organizations is developing across the Community to ensure 
that the interests of the various stakeholders in this area are being taken care of. But is the 
network that is developing here or in any other cases an adequate network? Is it the best 
network? Does it function, not just to elaborate guidelines and detailed criteria and procedures, 
but also to ensure that they are effectively and fairly implemented throughout the Community? 
There is much more to this than just removing barriers and obstacles. And, there is much more 
than the Commission - in this case a small number of people in DG III - can possibly do on its 
own. The Commission is not in the business of direct policy implementation. It is increasingly 
in the business of building up the networks of partnerships through which implementation 
works.
The Transformation of the Customs Services
A second and more familiar example is the transformation of the customs services which is an 
absolutely indispensable requirement of the success of the whole 1992 programme.  
In the public mind, nothing symbolizes the spirit of 1992 more clearly than the removal of 
customs posts and customs controls on roads and trains, at ports and airports. The costs to 
business and the delays and frustrations for travellers have been carefully documented and 
widely publicised. 'When the barriers come down' has become familiar shorthand for the 
manifold changes that the completion of the internal market entails. In keeping with political 
rhetoric it puts the emphasis on negative integration. But removing intra-EC customs barriers 
is only the start of the process. From the standpoint of positive integration the picture looks 
very different. A new integrated EC-wide customs organization has to be brought into being to 
supersede the existing twelve national customs services. Far from disappearing, the integration 
of customs services poses major problems of planning and managing large-scale 
reorganization.
The positive integration dimensions of this task have not been fully appreciated outside the 
national customs services themselves and DG XXI, the Directorate of the Commission 
responsible for the Customs Services. Rather than just abolishing a series of obsolete 
organizations it is necessary to create a new system with different purposes, structure and 
systems of management. In effect, what is involved is the management of an 
intergovernmental merger. The objective is to create a coordinated intergovernmental system 
with a supranational mission. The twelve separate services must be brought together to 
administer European customs policies on a consistent basis rather than functioning as the 
separate but interdependent services they have been in the past.
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experience of managing mergers in business to show that the process of creating a new 
corporate identity to displace long-established loyalties is difficult and long-drawn-out. These 
predictable problems are compounded, in European public management, by marked 
differences of culture and tradition and tenacious national loyalties in the organizations that 
must work together.
The integration of customs services is further complicated because at least three different 
changes are taking place at the same time. The most prominent is the process of dismantling 
internal border controls and the organizations that administer them. The second is the 
redefinition of administrative functions. Border checks perform several different functions 
related to immigration and taxation policies as well as controls on drug trafficking, terrorism, 
animal health and welfare, including protection of endangered species and disease prevention. 
The third change is the design and development of a new and strengthened system to control 
external EC frontiers.
The scale of these changes is considerable. Apart from anything else it presents sizeable 
personnel and industrial relations problems. The customs service together employ about 
130,000 people and before changes began there were about 2,000 customs posts. The side 
effects of the integration of customs services will include redeployment, redundancies, 
reorganization and training over several years. Perhaps as many as 30,000 customs jobs will 
disappear. A management of change process at the EC level, with the active participation of 
the administrations of the twelve Member States, is essential to success. But the skills and 
expertise needed to plan and manage this institutional transformation are in very short supply, 
not least because the Commission has never been comfortable with the responsive non-
hierarchical style of management that managing the transition from one pattern of organization 
to another involves.
Conclusion
This is really only a foretaste of the challenges ahead. With the development of the 
Community, the Commission will have to rethink its own role in the management of 
Community policies and adapt its own organization in order to assist and accelerate the 
adaptation of the wider European Public Service.
As the Community moves into areas of positive integration, as it now appears set to do, the 
demands on the public service to make well-prepared and well-coordinated responses to new 
tasks will increase. Much greater efforts will be needed in the future to ensure that the 
administrative partnerships which are essential to effective policy implementation are 
established and strengthened.
Like all processes of managing change and promoting organizational development, success 
depends on effective communication of general intentions on the one hand and responsiveness 
to specific circumstances and problems on the other. The commitment to innovation must be 
clear but sensitivity to the legitimate anxieties and uncertainties of those who are supposed to 
implement changes is also vital.
Successful businesses now accept that, as a matter of course, they must invest substantial time 
and effort in the process of building the management capacities that will underpin future 
performance. We need to instil a similar attitude into the enterprise of building the future 
management capacities of the European Public Service.
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